Legal status of artificial intelligence carriers: ontological and prognotic aspects

Authors

  • Ilya Orlovsky graduate student of the Department of Philosophy of the Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.37772/2518-1718-2025-4(52)-17

Keywords:

law and technology, electronic person, generative artificial intelligence and law, artificial intelligence liability, legal regulation of artificial intelligence, artificial personality, artificial sociality

Abstract

Problem setting. Artificial intelligence is developing rapidly, not only transforming various fields of knowledge and social life, but even revolutionizing them. The emergence of generative artificial intelligence, such as GPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer) and GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks), makes it possible to create new content autonomously even in areas that have traditionally been considered, so to speak, “exclusively human,” and that are directly related to the most important and sensitive issues, namely human life, health, and safety. Examples include the pharmaceutical industry, personalized medicine, and research aimed at addressing climate change and sustainable development, among others. In connection with the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies, humanity is facing new problems as well as ethical and social challenges, such as privacy, algorithmic bias, and the need for global governance. In the context of these global transformations, both at the national and international levels, intense debates are taking place within academic circles, and various approaches to the legal regulation of artificial intelligence are being developed. These approaches are usually based on ethical principles and safety standards. In light of these trends, there is an emerging and increasingly urgent call to understand the legal status of artificial intelligence entities and to ensure their implementation within the legal system. Given the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies at the current stage of societal development, it can be assumed that in the near future new paradigms and separate legal regimes may be required to develop legal procedures related to artificial intelligence entities. Therefore, under conditions of the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence technologies, a number of issues are arising and becoming increasingly relevant, particularly those related to determining the legal status of artificial intelligence entities and liability associated with their use. Analysis of recent researches and publications. As artificial intelligence technologies increasingly affect various aspects of our lives, it is critically important to understand and assess the challenges and opportunities they present. Contemporary philosophers, engineers, legal scholars, and policymakers who seek to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of artificial intelligence on society and how it should be regulated devote their works to examining the legal, ethical, and political consequences arising from the development, deployment, and everyday use of artificial intelligence and algorithmic systems. A number of works by Ukrainian legal scholars are devoted to the issue of the legal status of artificial intelligence entities and their liability. According to several leading Ukrainian scholars, artificial intelligence entities should be regarded as objects of legal relations. In the countries of the European Union, drawing on the scientific research of leading scholars, a key document of contemporary European law was the adoption of EU Regulation 2024/1689 of 13 June 2024, which establishes harmonized rules on artificial intelligence; however, the issue of determining the legal status of artificial intelligence remains unresolved therein. The purpose of this research is to determine the legal status of artificial intelligence entities at the current stage of development and to explore ways of identifying new paradigms for defining their legal status, taking into account their transformative potential to ensure a positive and sustainable impact on individuals and society, as well as, on the basis of these trends, possible directions for the development of legal procedures in the near future. Article’s main body. Globally, there are three main approaches to the issue of the legal status of artificial intelligence. The majority of scholars adhere to the view that artificial intelligence entities do not deserve legal personality and have concluded that they should not be regarded as subjects of law. These are technologies created by humans and used as auxiliary tools in decision-making processes; that is, they complement rather than replace human capabilities. The primary function of artificial intelligence entities is to assist humans in intellectual, physical, social, and other activities. Since artificial intelligence entities lack biological, cognitive, emotional-moral, and legal essential characteristics that constitute the concept of “human”, the scopes of the concepts “human” and “artificial intelligence entities” are incompatible, which substantiates the inexpediency of granting the latter legal personality. Other researchers maintain that, due to current technological limitations, it is premature to attribute moral and legal personality to artificial intelligence entities; however, once they reach a certain level of development at which they become comparable to humans, they may be considered subjects of law. A third group of scholars sees merit in the possibility of granting complex artificial intelligence entities legal personality along with corresponding legal protection similar to that afforded to humans. In Ukraine, the majority of researchers tend to believe that, since artificial intelligence entities cannot be subjects of law endowed with a partial set of human rights and freedoms without their completeness, unity, interconnection, and interdependence, they should, in the future, be legislatively defined as objects of law. Responsibility for their functioning should rest with the manufacturer, owner, or user – who is a subject of law. Furthermore, the introduction of the concept of an “electronic person” for artificial intelligence entities requires further extensive interdisciplinary research. Conclusions and prospects for development. At the level of domestic legislation, there are currently no legal norms that define the legal status of artificial intelligence entities. At present, there are no grounds for recognizing them as subjects of legal relations. Further research into the current state of technological advances in the field of artificial intelligence, their role in enhancing cooperation between humans and artificial systems, the use of artificial intelligence entities in society, and the ethical challenges associated therewith, as well as forecasts regarding the future of artificial intelligence entities, the emergence of artificial general intelligence, the impact of quantum computing on artificial intelligence, and innovations in hardware specifically designed for artificial intelligence entities, determines the directions of future scholarly inquiry and encourages interdisciplinary cooperation aimed at developing transparent, reliable, and robust artificial intelligence models. The results of such research may be applied to the formation of legal relations, issues of liability, and regulatory mechanisms related to artificial intelligence entities.

References

1. Pavlenko, Zh.O., Vodorezova, S.R. (2021). The concept of an electronic person in digital reality. Bulletin of the Yaroslav the Wise National Law University. Series: Philosophy. Vol. 3, No. 50. Pp. 59–70. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21564/2663-5704.50.235427 [in Ukrainian].

2. Karmaza, O., & Hrabovska, O. (2021). Elektronna osoba (osobystist) yak subiekt pravovidnosyn u tsyvilistychnomu protsesi. Pidpryiemnytstvo, hospodarstvo i pravo, (2), 5–10. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32849/2663-5313/2021.2.01 [in Ukrainian].

3. Korzh, I. (2025). The need to establish the legal status of artificial intelligence. Information and Law. No. 4(55). P. 62–72. DOI: https://doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2025.4(55).346348 [in Ukrainian].

4. Pryamitsyn, V., Grachova, O. (2024). Civil liability for artificial intelligence: problems and prospects. Law and Society. Vol. 2, No. 1. P. 4–5 [in Ukrainian].

5. Zalevsky, S. (2024). Legal personality of artificial intelligence in the sphere of intellectual property law: civil law problems. International scientific e-journal ΛΌΓOΣ. ONLINE. No. 16. URL: https://www.ukrlogos.in.ua/10.11232-2663-4139.16.51.html [in Ukrainian].

6. Popovych, T.P. (2025). Legal personality of artificial intelligence: future or illusion? Scientific Bulletin of Uzhhorod National University. Law Series. No. 89(1). P. 144–149. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2025.89.1.18 [in Ukrainian].

7. Smuha, N.A., Yeung, K. (2025). The European Union’s AI Act: Beyond Motherhood and Apple Pie? In: Smuha N.A., ed. The Cambridge Handbook of the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge Law Handbooks. Cambridge University Press; P. 228–258 [in Ukrainian].

8. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance). EUR-Lex Access to European Union law. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng [in English].

9. Vokrug A. Artificial Intelligence and Legal Identity. Unite.AI. 10/27/2023. URL: https://www.unite.ai/uk/artificial-intelligence-and-legal-identity [in Ukrainian].

10. Isaak, J., Hanna, M.J. (2018). User Data Privacy: Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and Privacy Protection. Computer. August. Vol. 51, No. 8. P. 56–59. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2018.3191268 [in English].

11. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, May 4, 2016, pp. 1–88 [in English].

12. Recommendation of the Council on OECD Legal Instruments Artificial Intelligence. OECD/LEGAL/0449 of 22.05.2019. OECD Legal Instruments. URL: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/oecd-legal-0449 (дата звернення: 10.10.2025) [in English].

13. Bryson, J.J., Diamantis, M.E., Grant, T.D. (2017). Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons. Artificial Intelligence and Law. No. 25. P. 273–291. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9 [in English].

14. Gordon, J.-S. (2020). Artifcial moral and legal personhood. Artificial Intelligence and Society. 09 September 2020. DOI: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-020-01063-2 [in English].

15. Chopra, S., White, L.F. (2004). Artificial Agents – Personhood in Law and Philosophy. Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI’2004, including Prestigious Applicants of Intelligent Systems, PAIS 2004, Valencia, Spain, August 22–27. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220837427_Artificial_Agents_-_Personhood_in_Law_and_Philosophy [in English].

Published

2025-12-23